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Introduction
At the IMF Research Conference in November 2013, Lawrence Summers delivered a speech in which he suggested that secular stagnation might be "the de…ning issue of our age" (Summers, 2013) . He argued that the natural real interest rate in the U.S. may have declined, reaching negative levels since at least the early 2000s, in the order of 2% or 3%. The fact that in this period actual long-term real rates have instead remained positive would explain why, despite the recurrent formation of bubbles in the …nancial and housing markets, capacity utilization has never been under any pressure, unemployment has not been remarkably low, and in ‡ation has been entirely quiescent. In this situation, not only a rate hike by the Federal Reserve in the near term could turn out to be premature, but even zero nominal interest rates could inhibit current and future economic activity, holding the U.S. economy below its potential.
Following Summers' remarks, the issue of secular stagnation is now taking the center stage in both the research and the policy agenda (see, for example, the important volume recently edited by Teulings and Baldwin, 2014) . As Eichengreen (2014) put it, however, secular stagnation is like the Rorschach inkblot test: it means di¤erent things to di¤erent people.
While Summers' argument focuses on the natural real interest rate and, ultimately, on aggregate demand (which is depressed by actual interest rates being higher than the natural rate), a second approach to this question rests on aggregate supply. In particular, a series of studies have recently hypothesized that potential growth in the U.S. may have come to a halt. 1 These studies recall that the world economy stagnated for many centuries until the Industrial Revolution and question the assumption that economic growth can persist forever, predicting a sharp deceleration of productivity and a return to stagnation. The focus of these studies is the United States, the country that has been identi…ed with the world technology frontier since the early XX century. 2 In this paper, we review these recent studies as well as other existing projections, discussing their implications for both the future evolution of long-run economic growth in the U.S. and for the level of the natural interest rate We start our investigation by examining the determinants of the natural interest rate. Barsky et al. (2014) show that cyclical factors related to the Great Recession of 2008-2009 and the subsequent weak recovery may have brought the natural interest rate down to negative values since 2009, close to the levels suggested by Summers. Abstracting from cyclical factors, however, it is unlikely that the natural interest rate will remain negative for a prolonged period of time: rising GDP per capita and prefer-ences for current vis-à-vis future consumption tend to keep the natural rate in positive territory. Nevertheless, a decline of the natural interest rate to low, albeit positive, levels in the long run seems to be a more concrete possibility. This would happen, in particular, in the case of a marked slowdown in GDP per capita.
To get some clues on the long-run prospects, we examine the sources of U.S. GDP per capita growth in the post-World War II period -which is equal to an average annual rate of 2:2% -and review existing projections about future growth rates. Gordon (2012 and predicts that the contribution of total factor productivity (TFP), the main source of U.S. economic expansion, will decline from 1:6 percentage points in 1950-2007 to just 1:0 points over the next 20 to 50 years. The reasons for this prediction are that the e¤ects of ICT seem to have already peaked, that TFP has started to decelerate in the last ten years, and that no other major breakthrough is in sight. But GDP per capita will be negatively a¤ected also by other transitory factors that are expected to slow down, especially the total number of hours worked and the accumulation of skills. The contribution of these factors, equal to 0:5 percentage points in the post-war period, could become nil in the period until 2060, as a result of the retirement of baby boomers, the approaching of a plateau in the years of schooling, and the rising relative cost of higher education. Overall, the lower contributions of TFP and transitory factors imply that the growth of GDP per capita will halve, increasing at a rate of 1:1%. In the case of log preferences for consumption, this would translate into a 1:1 percentage point decline in the natural interest rate.
This gloomy prediction seems to be broadly con…rmed by other projections. In particular, the fading contribution of the transitory factors is in line with the most recent forecasts based on the …ndings of Jorgenson et al. (2005) and the OECD (2014a). Regarding TFP, the OECD seems to endorse a sharp deceleration, although at a later stage (the period 2030-2060). Annual TFP growth of just around 1% is also consistent with recent models that split TFP into research intensity (i.e. the share of workers employed in research and development) and a size e¤ect (the increase of the labor force that, in the long-run, is equal to that of the population). 3 In these models, a deceleration of TFP is the result of lower population growth, which implies a lower growth in the number of inventors.
Another important issue concerns income inequality. The analysis of GDP per capita, in fact, focuses implicitly on the average household. However, the recent strong rise of inequality has seen the share of total income received by households in the top 1% of the income distribution increase sharply, while income has been stagnating for more than 30 years for the remaining 99% of the U.S. population. Income inequality is also relevant for the natural interest rate, due to the higher propensity to save of households in the upper percentiles of the income distribution: for a given average income, a more unequal distribution implies higher saving and lower interest rates. If inequality keeps growing at the same speed as it has in the last three decades, the income of the households in the bottom 99% of the distribution will grow at an annual rate that is 0:5 percentage points lower than the rate recorded for the entire U.S. population. Therefore, if the projections of GDP per capita growth of 1:1% are con…rmed, these households'income will increase at a rate of just 0:6%.
Our review stresses that the most important factors for predicting long-term economic growth as well as the natural interest rate are TFP, population (which also contributes to TFP), human capital and income inequality. We then examine these factors from a broader historical perspective. The debate on secular stagnation is, in fact, a cyclical question that has been raised after all deep and prolonged recession. Revisiting the data and theories considered in the past helps us to understand, with the bene…t of hindsight, the reasons why pessimistic predictions turned out to be wrong.
In retrospect, it emerges that pessimistic predictions were wrong neither because they built on erroneous theories or data, nor because they failed to predict new technologies, but because they underestimated the potential of the technologies that already existed. This analysis also suggests that pessimism about ICT may be unwarranted: its di¤usion among U.S. households and businesses has quite closely matched that of electricity in the early XX century. Moreover, current research in the ICT sector is turning to the development of consumption devices, resembling the shift towards home appliances that occurred in the 1920s and 1930s and that anticipated the economic boom observed after World War II.
Historical experience also suggests a number of issues that should be tackled by future research. First, the key question concerning TFP is whether there are diminishing returns on research; that is, whether making progress becomes increasingly di¢ cult as technology advances. The fact that, historically, the number of patents granted could scarcely keep pace with population growth has often been interpreted as evidence of diminishing returns (see, for example, Merton, 1935 , or Griliches, 1990 ). This is, however, still a very open issue. The long-run stability of the growth rate of U.S. GDP per capita since 1870 does not allow us to rule out that technological progress has instead a "fractal quality". In other words, it may well be that the probability that TFP increases does not depend on its level. Interestingly, the Pareto distribution, which is often used to describe productivities in the cross-section of …rms, has exactly this property. We suggest, then, that the properties of the distribution of productivities in the time series and the cross-section of …rms should be analyzed jointly.
Second, the relevant population for TFP growth, i.e. the people who can push the technology frontier outward, no longer coincides with the U.S. labor force, as suggested by many indicators (such as the rise in the share of U.S. patents granted to foreign residents). It is worth exploring, then, the extent to which future TFP growth is likely to bene…t from the integration of emerging countries into the global economy.
Third, the evolution of human capital, usually proxied by the average number of years of schooling and workers'experience, is apparently more worrisome. In the short run, the increasing relative cost of higher education is making it less a¤ordable. In the longer run, its accumulation, as measured in growth models, is bounded from above: work experience is limited by the retirement age, years of schooling by the fact that, well before the retirement age, students must leave school to repay education costs. Of these two problems, rising education costs could be e¤ectively addressed by a variety of policies (like those that are currently being considered by the U.S. government), but also by private initiatives, such as the recent proliferation of Internet-based educational resources. One issue that we discuss and suggest for future research is whether human capital can grow even if the average years of schooling and work experience remain constant. In particular, human capital could be accumulated by raising the quality of education (intensive margin) as well as the varieties of knowledge (extensive margin). If this were true, human capital could keep contributing to economic growth over and above the mere number of years of schooling and work experience.
Fourth, the rise in the skill premium has been acknowledged as a key determinant of the recent increase in income inequality. Although the price mechanism can be a powerful force for promoting equality, the adjustment of demand and, especially, supply of the relevant skills can take many decades. Before the full adjustment takes place, relative wage di¤erentials can become very wide, fuelling large and persistent income inequalities, which, nonetheless, start declining at some point. Economic history shows, for example, that technological progress has been accompanied by repeated reversals in the demand for skilled workers. The direction of technical change, then, can be shaped by relative prices, which determine the pro…t incentives to innovate and the amount of research activity directed towards di¤erent factors of production (Acemoglu, 1998 and . Because both market forces and public policies can a¤ect wage di¤erentials, possibly giving rise to long "inequality cycles", predicting income inequality in the long run is a tough challenge and simple extrapolation from recent trends may turn out to be severely misleading.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 revisits the determinants of the natural interest rate. In Section 3, we review the sources of U.S. GDP per capita in the post-war period and discuss existing projections about their future evolution. Since it emerges that the most important source of U.S. economic growth is TFP, a variable whose ultimate determinants have not been spelled out, Section 4 brie ‡y reviews models that explain its growth and discusses their implications. Section 5 tackles the issue of income inequality. Section 6 examines the factors that emerged as the most important for long-term economic growth from a broader historical perspective. Section 7 concludes. 8 
Determinants of the natural interest rate
The natural real interest rate (NRIR) was de…ned by Wicksell (1898) as the rate that "is neutral in respect to commodity prices, and tends neither to raise nor to lower them". Since then, various de…nitions have appeared in the literature.
In new Keynesian models, it is the real rate of return required to make output equal to its potential level, that is the level consistent with ‡exible prices and wages and constant markups in the markets for goods and labor (Woodford, 2003) . While this de…nition is theoretically appealing, its usefulness for the practice of monetary policy faces the key hurdle that the NRIR is not directly observable. In addition, the NRIR ‡uctuates over time in response to a variety of shocks to preferences and technology, making it more di¢ cult to assess its precise value. Moreover, setting the policy interest rate to make the real rate equal to the NRIR may be impossible during deep recessions, because of the bound that prevents nominal interest rates from dipping below zero. Despite these considerations, the NRIR remains an important reference point for monetary policy, whose estimate is worth attempting. Barsky et al. (2014) use a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model in order to estimate the NRIR that would prevail in an economy with neither nominal rigidities nor shocks to prices and wage markups. 4 Their results show that the NRIR follows a highly procyclical pattern, with very pronounced swings (…g. 1). Perhaps surprisingly, it does not display a substantially larger drop during the Great Recession than in the previous two downturns. However, in stark contrast with earlier episodes, it has remained persistently negative even during the recovery. In this model, this result is largely due to the strong increase in precautionary saving induced by a negative and extremely persistent shock to the risk premium in the Euler equation. This shock is necessary in the model to explain both the Great Recession and the subsequent weak recovery.
Thus, the NRIR may have turned negative since the Great Recession. The key question, however, is whether it could remain negative for a much more extended time period, i.e. whether its low level could re ‡ect persistent structural problems rather than cyclical factors. 5 In textbook models of economic growth, the NRIR is the real interest rate in a balanced-growth equilibrium, that is a long-run equilibrium in which all the variables grow at a constant rate. In the basic Ramsey model with exogenous technological progress, the real interest rate is determined by the growth rate of total factor productivity (TFP) and intertemporal preferences:
where r is the equilibrium real interest rate, the discount factor (households'degree of impatience), x the exogenous rate of TFP growth, and 1= the intertemporal elasticity of substitution (see, for example, Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1995).
A decline in TFP growth (i.e. in x) or an increased willingness to save (corresponding to a reduction in or ) raise the detrended level of the capital stock in the balanced-growth equilibrium. Equation (1) suggests that these shocks lower the marginal product of capital and reduce the equilibrium interest rate. The intuition is that if households decide to consume less today and raise their savings in order to consume more tomorrow, then a lower interest rate is required to equate the higher saving with higher investment.
Given that the discount rate is assumed to be positive, equation (1) also shows that in the long run the NRIR can be negative only if TFP growth becomes negative and by a su¢ ciently large extent to more than o¤set the positive rate of intertemporal substitution.
A temporarily negative equilibrium interest rate could also result if, for any reason, the economy has accumulated "too much" capital stock. In this case, because there are diminishing returns on capital accumulation, the real interest rate -which is the marginal productivity of capital net of depreciation -could become negative. 6 The standard Ramsey model, however, precludes the possibility of this occurring in the long run because, in the balanced-growth equilibrium, the interest rate must exceed the growth rate of the capital stock. In particular, it must be r x + n, where n is the growth rate of the population. 7 The possibility of accumulating an "excessively large" capital stock, instead, is not precluded in overlapping generations models. In particular, in a celebrated article, Diamond (1965) shows that, with overlapping generations, a competitive economy can reach a balanced-growth equilibrium in which there is "too much" capital. In this case, the economy is dynamically ine¢ cient and a Pareto improvement can be achieved by inducing all the generations to consume more and save less when they are young.
One must then investigate the possibility that the interest rate is negative because the economy has accumulated too much capital stock. In the Appendix, we spell out the details of a growth model in which we explore this possibility. In particular, we consider a model in which agents have …nite lifetimes and, following Blanchard (1985) , we assume that labor productivity (and, therefore, also the real wage) declines with age at a rate ! (an hypothesis that also re ‡ects the fact that, after retiring, people receive pensions that are lower than their previous wages). This assumption reduces the NRIR. In fact, anticipating that there will be less income in the future, people want to save more, thereby lowering the interest rate. Because the e¤ect of a steeper decline in wages is the same as that of a lower discount rate , it can be shown that:
Equation (2) implies that, in theory, r could be negative if ! is su¢ ciently large. However, as shown in the Appendix, the value that this parameter must take in order to obtain negative interest rates seems quite implausible.
8 6 An excess of capital stock could be the result of a shock such as a sudden decline of the population (due, for example, to an epidemic or a mass migration), which would determine too much capital per capita, or of erroneous expectations (over-optimism) that lead to an excessive accumulation of capital, which is then reversed as soon as agents become aware of the mistake. Moreover, Abel et al. (1989) prove that in a competitive economy that accumulates excess capital stock, the rate of investment must be larger than the return on capital. Data for gross capital income and gross investment, available for the period 1969-2012, show, instead, that pro…ts have been constantly higher than investments, and especially so in the last four years (…g. 2). This …nding con…rms that, abstracting from cyclical factors, a negative NRIR in the long run is unlikely.
While a negative equilibrium interest rate for a prolonged period of time is unlikely, a decline to a very low, albeit positive, level seems to be a more concrete possibility. This would happen, in particular, following a strong slowdown in long-run economic growth. This possibility is analyzed in the next sections.
3 Sources of post-war U.S. growth
The growth rate of U.S. real GDP per capita has been very stable since the end of the XIX century (…g. 3). This apparent lack of persistent changes underlies the view that the U.S. economy is on a long-run balanced-growth path -a view supported by a number of stylized facts, such as the absence of trends in the capital-output ratio, emphasized by Kaldor (1961) . This …nding has also been used to argue in favor of exogenous growth models and against more recent endogenous growth models (Jones, 1995b) . 9 Therefore, it makes sense to start our analysis by considering the implications of a standard exogenous growth model, while a discussion of its limitations and some insights from alternative models are deferred to Section 4.
Assume that total output produced at time t, Y t , is given by
where A t is TFP, is a positive parameter, K t is physical capital, 2 (0; 1) is the share of physical capital in value added, and H t is the stock of human capital. The last variable has the following standard expression:
where L t is the total number of hours worked, h t is human capital per hour worked, s t is the amount of time spent accumulating human capital (usually proxied by the average number of years of schooling and workers' experience), and > 0 is the Mincerian return to education. From (3), we can write GDP per capita as:
where P t is total population.
Using (5), the growth rate of GDP per capita can decomposed into the growth rates of its four main components: the employment ratio (hours worked over total capita would make a remarkably precise prediction. At the end of the 1980s, the forecast would fall short by less than 5%. 13 population), total factor productivity, the capital-output ratio, and human capital per hour worked. A quanti…cation for the period 1950-2007 is reported in equation (6) using data gathered by Fernald and Jones (2014) ; in this equation, we denote the growth rates of GDP per capita (y t = Y t =P t ), the employment ratio (e t = L t =P t ), TFP (A t ), capital output (k t = K t =Y t ), and human capital per hour worked (h t ) with, respectively, _ y, _ e, _ a, _ k, and _ h:
. (6) Equation (6) shows that, between 1950 and 2007, GDP per capita grew at an annual rate of 2:2%. The exogenous growth rate of TFP has been by far the most important factor, increasing at a rate of 1:6% per year and explaining about 75% of the U.S. economic development in the post-war period. 10 Human capital, measured by the years of schooling and workers' experience, contributed almost 20%, growing at an annual rate of 0:4%. The contribution of the employment ratio was small (6%), as this variable grew at a rate of just 0:1% per year. Physical capital increased at the same rate as output, hence its contribution to the growth of GDP per capita has been nil. 11 In the following section, we review existing projections about these four determinants of the growth rate of GDP per capita.
Total factor productivity
In two recent papers, Gordon (2012 and 2014) warned about a possible decline in the growth rate of TFP. Taking a very long-run perspective, he recalls that the Industrial Revolution was preceded by several centuries of stagnation, in which the growth rates of GDP per capita and of TFP were almost nil. In particular, Gordon (2012) focuses on GDP growth per capita in the frontier economy, which is identi…ed with the U.K. from 1300 to 1906, and with the U.S. thereafter. Noting that growth almost stagnated from 1300 to about 1750, at about 0:2% per year, he then identi…es three key phases 10 The parameter is calibrated at 0:32. An estimate of is not needed, since the contribution of _ a= (1 ) is obtained as a residual. 11 An alternative decomposition of output per capita considers capital per worker instead of the capital-output ratio (i.e. y t = e t A t (K t =L t ) h 1 t ). Given that capital per worker increased signi…cantly between 1950 and 2007, while the capital-output ratio remained broadly constant, this alternative decomposition suggests a somewhat smaller role for productivity and human capital. Although any growth accounting exercise is arbitrary, we prefer the one reported in equation (5), because it focuses more closely on the sources of economic growth that, in these models, are supposed to be "autonomous", i.e. productivity and human capital. In endogenous growth frameworks such as the AK-model, instead, physical capital is also an autonomous source of economic growth. See also Section 4.
14 of the Industrial Revolution: 12 In the …rst phase, the annual growth rate of GDP per capita gradually rose from 0:2% (before the year 1750) to almost 1% at the end of the XIX century. In this period, the most important innovations were the steam engine and the railroads, which were developed between 1750 and 1830, although their economic e¤ects peaked after about 150 years.
In the second phase, GDP growth per capita rose up to a record-high annual rate of 2.5% during the 1960s. The main inventions characterizing this phase were the internal combustion engine and electricity. They were developed between 1870 and 1900, but it took about 100 years before their full e¤ects fed through to the economy.
The third phase took o¤ with the invention of the computer and the Internet revolution, from 1960 onwards. Their impact on TFP peaked in the decade between 1995 and 2005, when GDP growth per capita averaged 1.8%, before declining thereafter.
Gordon's projections draw on the fact that the e¤ects of ICT on TFP seem to have already peaked and no other major breakthrough is in sight. In particular, he claims that the research e¤orts are currently focused on the development of consumption devices (mostly in the areas of entertainment and communication), rather than on labor-saving innovations. Other …ndings corroborate this analysis. For example, the decline in the price index for ICT equipment, which was extremely steep in the mid1990s, at annual rates in a range between 10% and 15%, attenuated thereafter and, in 2012, ICT prices barely fell at all (…g. 4). This result is presumably due to a sharp slowdown in TFP growth. Using sectoral data, Byrne et al. (2013) con…rm that in the period 2004-2012 TFP slowed down in the ICT sector with respect to the previous decade and that the overall ICT contribution to labor productivity growth in the non-farm business sector diminished (this contribution being the sum of TFP growth in the ICT sector and capital deepening due to ICT equipment). In the period 2004-2012, both TFP growth in the ICT sector and the overall ICT contribution to labor productivity growth returned to the levels observed between the mid-1970s and 1994.
Based on these …ndings, Gordon (2014) projects that future TFP growth will ‡uctuate around the same average rate it has recorded since 1972, which is 0:6 percentage points lower with respect to the annual growth rate observed in the entire post-World War II period. This view is apparently shared by many others (see, inter alia, Cowen, 2011, and Vijg, 2011), including international organizations such as the OECD. In projecting long-run economic growth, the OECD (2014a) predicts, in fact, that TFP growth will be temporarily equal to 1:7% in the period 2012-2030 and that it will then decline to 1:1% in the subsequent 30 years.
Human capital
Human capital accumulation has been a signi…cant contributor to U.S. economic growth. The main factor behind its increase is the exceptional rise in the years spent in school by U.S. residents. Overall, the average number of years of schooling completed by Americans aged at least 25 years old rose by about two-thirds between 1900 and 2010, from 8 to almost 14 years (…g. 5, panel a).
Educational attainments, however, seem to be close to a plateau. Consider, for example, the ratio of high-school graduates to 18-year-olds. This ratio, which was only 6% in 1900, had climbed to about 80% by 1970; 13 very recent estimates, however, …nd that the share of 18-year-olds with high-school diplomas ‡attened in the subsequent 30 years (Murnane, 2013) . U.S. census cohort data con…rm that the share of high-school graduates does not show visible signs of improvement since the class of people born in the early 1950s (…g. 5, panel b). The picture is similar for college attainment rates. The ratio of college graduates to 23-year-olds, which was only 2% in 1900, had risen to 24% by 1980; by 2010, it had risen to 30%, but only thanks to the strong increase in women's attainment rates, while for men it remained at roughly the same level as in 1980.
Many authors believe that the contribution of human capital accumulation to U.S. economic growth will slow sharply in the next few decades. One obvious reason for this is the fact that graduation rates cannot grow above 100%, so their sharp rise observed since the start of the XX century, which continued after World War II, cannot go on forever. In addition, education cannot last for people's entire life: at one point, students must leave school and start working to pay back schooling costs and take advantage of their education. From this perspective, the current maximum years of schooling (those achieved by doctoral and post-doctoral students) appear to be close to a reasonable peak and, as a consequence, average years of schooling may have limited margins for increasing further in the U.S.. This is also because some graduation rates, such as those regarding high school, seem to be already very close to a physiological maximum, despite being still below 100%. For example, Murnane (2013) …nds that high-school graduation reached almost 85% in 2010 and, as also pointed out by Heckman and LaFontaine (2010), a signi…cant portion of the remaining 15% share is explained by the higher dropout rates among the military, minorities (blacks and Hispanics) as well as by young people sent to prison. 14 Another reason for the possible slowdown of human capital accumulation is that, since the early 1970s, the cost of university education has more than tripled with respect to the overall rate of in ‡ation, making enrollment inaccessible for many young people. Increasing di¢ culties in …nding college-level jobs after graduation are also making college tuition and fees less a¤ordable. Gordon (2014) suggests that, although a college degree still pays o¤ in terms of higher income and lower risk of unemployment, about one-fourth of college graduates does not obtain a college-level job in the …rst few years after graduation.
According to Jorgenson et al. (2005) , the annual growth rate of human capital due to both increased schooling and the rising level of worker experience will decline to about 0:1% in 2010-2020 (from 0:4% per year in 1950-2007) -almost a complete halt. 15 Similarly, the OECD (2014a) projects that human capital will increase at an annual rate of just 0:1% in 2012-2030 and by 0:2% in the following 30 years.
Employment ratio
The rise in the ratio of the total number of hours worked to the total population accounts for 6% of U.S. post-war economic growth. This is, however, the result of very di¤erent dynamics.
The …rst and most important factor supporting the employment ratio has been the movement of women into the labor force, which occurred mostly between 1950 and the early 2000s (…g. 6). 16 The female participation rate rose from less than 20% to 60% during the XX century, before declining somewhat in the last 10 years. The baby boom, which started in 1946 and lasted almost 20 years, was the second factor supporting the growth of the labor force, especially between the 1970s and the early 2000s, when baby boomers were in their prime working years (aged , when the participation rate is highest. On the other hand, the growth of the employment ratio was dampened by a reduction in the participation rate of men, which started as early as in 1950, and, most importantly, by the decrease in the number of hours worked. The average number of weekly hours worked, equal to about 60 in 1890, had fallen to 37 in 1950, ending up at less than 33 in 2012. 17 Thus, as for human capital, which was sustained by the rapid spread of education to all American workers, the employment ratio was sustained by a big "one-time event", namely the participation of women in the labor force. On a balanced-growth path the contribution of this variable should be nil, but, since 2008, baby boomers have started to retire and this demographic trend is expected to continue to negatively a¤ect the employment ratio over the next two decades. As a consequence, even if participation rates were to stabilize for any age class and gender, the retirement of baby boomers would make the size of the labor force decrease relative to the total population, resulting in a negative trend of the employment ratio over the next two decades.
According to the OECD (2014a), the employment ratio, which had already started to diminish before the Great Recession (at an annual rate of 0:2% in 2000-2007), will decline further in 2012-2030, at a rate of 0:3% per year. In particular, the participation rate of people aged 15 and older, is forecast to decline by almost 4 percentage points, to 58:5%. The employment ratio is projected to recover somewhat in 2030-2060, when it will grow at 0:1% per year. 
Capital-output ratio
The contribution of the capital-output ratio to U.S. economic growth has been nil over the post-World War II period. Many economists, however, have recently started to fear that this contribution could become negative, given that investment rates have declined substantially following the Great Recession (see, for example, Lindsey, 2013, and BIS, 2014, OECD, 2014b). Low investment is considered worrisome also because less physical capital could imply a limited di¤usion of new technologies among …rms, with a negative e¤ect on both labor productivity and TFP growth.
After collapsing in 2008-2009 to the lowest values since World War II, the share of nominal investment over nominal GDP, the indicator that is most often used for cross-country comparisons, stood at 16.3% in the fourth quarter of 2013 (…g. 7). This level is among the lowest on record during expansionary phases of the business cycle.
This indicator, however, is biased, due to the well-known declining trend of capital good prices relative to overall prices (Gordon, 1990) . The share of real investment in real GDP -which is not a¤ected by relative prices -was equal to 16:7% in the fourth quarter of 2013 (…g. 7). More than four years after the end of the recession, this value is still lower than its steady state level, which is estimated at 17:2% by the OECD (2014b). The delayed recovery of the investment share, however, seems to be entirely ascribable to the severity of the last recession. In fact, the drop in this investment share during the Great Recession was much larger than for all the previous contractions, equal to almost 7 percentage points, against an average drop of less than 20 3 percentage points in the previous ten recessions. Even without resorting to precise statistical analysis, the current rise in the investment share does not appear to be less steep than in the past expansionary phases of the business cycle. Thus, the gradual return of the investment share toward its steady state suggests that the capital-output ratio should not pose an obstacle to long-run labor productivity growth.
The OECD (2014a), in fact, projects that the growth of the capital-output ratio will continue to be approximately nil over the next 50 years. The contribution to U.S. economic growth will be marginally positive in 2012-2030 (when it will increase at an annual rate of 0:1%), as physical capital will be rebuilt after the Great Recession, and marginally negative thereafter ( 0:1%).
Summing up
The rise in the employment ratio, human capital accumulation and the stability of the capital-output ratio contributed 
Growth, research intensity and size e¤ect
The results of the previous section have shown that the most important source of economic growth (in the U.S., but also in most other advanced and developing countries) is TFP, a variable whose dynamic is assumed to be exogenous, estimated as a residual, and whose ultimate determinants have not been spelled out. This is clearly not satisfactory. 18 Another challenge to growth models is the …nding that the search for innovation -as measured by the number of scientists and engineers engaged in research and development (R&D) or by expenditure on R&D -has grown very sharply. For example, the share of U.S. workers employed in R&D, which was 0:25% in 1950, by the mid-2000s had risen fourfold, to 1%. 19 To come to grips with this phenomenon, Jones (2002) assumes that TFP growth has the following functional form:
where > 0 is a constant, a parameter that speci…es the returns (decreasing, constant or increasing) on research activity, and R t the number of researchers (where we put a bar to mean that, as we explain below, the relevant number of researchers may include foreign researchers). The rationale of equation (7) is the following. First, TFP increases because workers employed in R&D develop non-rival ideas on how to organize inputs to produce more output. Because of non-rivalry, income per capita depends on the total number of ideas in the economy and not on the number of ideas per person. On a balanced-growth path, the number of researchers is a constant share of the labor force; the latter, in turn, is a constant share of the total population and, therefore, the level of TFP depends on the size of the population. In other words, more population means more potential inventors so that, in the long run, the growth of income per capita is driven uniquely by population growth. Second, the growth rate of TFP also depends on the level of TFP, in order to account for potentially non-constant returns to scale in the search for ideas. In particular, < 1 ( > 1) implies diminishing (increasing) returns to the research activity, while = 1 implies constant returns.
Simple algebra shows that, if TFP evolves according to equation (7), on a constantgrowth path the decomposition (5) transforms into:
1 . This is the same decomposition as in equation (5),
except that now, due to (7), the exogenous growth of TFP is split into two terms that, together, correspond to the stock of ideas. The former is R t = L t , which represents research intensity, i.e. the strength of the hunt for new ideas. The latter is a size e¤ect, measured by the total number of workers in the economy L t , which is the rights, competition and regulatory pressures. Permanent changes in these variables, which have frequently occurred throughout U.S. history, should lead to permanent changes in economic growth rates. The theoretical relevance of these changes, however, contrasts with the aforementioned empirical stability of long-run growth.
denominator of research intensity. 20 The relevant researchers, those who can help push the technology frontier outward, do not necessarily live in the U.S.. Therefore, R t and L t may refer to researchers and workers who are also in other countries. For example, Jones (2002) assumes that the researchers able to extend the frontiers of knowledge are residents of the …ve largest OECD countries (France, Germany, Japan, the U.K., and the U.S.).
The growth rate of TFP between 1950 and 2007, equal to 1.6% (equation (6)), can thus be decomposed into the growth rate of research intensity and the size e¤ect. In the following quanti…cation, in which we use data from Fernald and Jones (2014), we retain the same notation as equation (6) and we also denote with _ r and _ l the growth rates of, respectively, the share of researchers (r t = R t = L t ) and the labor force of the countries where researches live ( L t ):
Equation (9) shows that the exogenous growth rate of TFP, which was equal to 1:6% per year during the period 1950-2007, can be decomposed into a rate of 1:2% due to research intensity and 0:4% due to the size e¤ect. 21 The value of resulting from the decomposition implies that is smaller than 1 and, therefore, that there are diminishing returns to scale on research. 22 The results reported in equations (6) and (9) highlight that, between 1950 and 2007, 80% of U.S. economic growth re ‡ected transitory factors. As mentioned above, in fact, in these models the rise of the population is the key determinant of long-run economic growth; therefore, only the size e¤ect can generate sustainable growth. The employment ratio and research intensity are shares and, as such, cannot grow forever. Moreover, as discussed in the previous section, many authors believe that also human capital cannot increase inde…nitely either. Some of these factors, especially the share of researchers and human capital, may still have margins to increase for some time but, in the very long run, this theory implies that economic growth should revert to the growth rate of the population.
Gordon's projection of an increase of TFP at an annual rate of 1:0% for the next few decades appears consistent with the outlook for research intensity and the size e¤ect. Let us assume that research intensity continues to grow until 2030 at the same 20 In equation (7), ideas arrive in a deterministic fashion. Kortum (1997) builds a general equilibrium model in which the ‡ow of ideas is stochastic, which yields the same implication that a growing number of researchers generates a constant productivity growth. 21 We recall that 74% is the share of the contribution of TFP to the overall annual growth of GDP per capita (see equation (6)). 22 Since the parameter can be normalized to 1 and given that _ r and _ l are equal to, respectively, 3:1% and 1:1%, it follows that is equal to 0:38. rate of 1:8% as the one observed since 1972 (the time period that Gordon labelled the "Third Industrial Revolution"); 23 moreover, U.S. census forecast data indicate annual growth of 0:8% of the U.S. labor force until 2030, which is consistent with the projections of the OECD (2014a). By applying the value of derived above, we obtain a prediction for the sum of _ r and _ l of 1:0%, which con…rms Gordon's projection.
Unequal growth
In the previous sections, we focused on GDP per capita, deriving the sources of its past growth as well as its future prospects from a model with a representative consumer. This analysis, however, neglects an important phenomenon that has occurred during the last three decades and that we discuss in this section, that is the rise of income inequality.
To understand why this phenomenon matters for our analysis, take, for example, the related and well-documented increase in the share of total income received by the households in the top 1% of the income distribution. If we refer economic development and welfare to 99% of the households and, in particular, to the households in the bottom 99% of the income distribution, rather than to the mean household as we have implicitly done in the previous sections, then growth has already been stagnating for more than 30 years. 24 But income inequality is also important for assessing the equilibrium interest rate. Households in upper percentiles of the income distribution have higher propensities to save. It follows that, for a given average income, a more unequal income distribution implies higher savings that, in order to be matched with higher investments, require a lower interest rate. 25 As we know from Section 2, a lower growth rate of GDP per capita implies that the equilibrium interest rate declines and this decline is stronger if lower economic growth is accompanied by higher income inequality. 26 The rise of income inequality is the result of two main phenomena: the decline of the labor share of income and the increase of wage inequality. Their role in determining income inequality is clear. A decline in the labor share, in fact, corresponds to an increase in the share of pro…ts. Because pro…ts typically go, as distributed dividends, to the households in the top percentiles of the income distribution, this phenomenon adds to the e¤ects of rising wage inequality, thereby further increasing income inequality. 27 In the following section we analyze the evolution of the labor share and of wage inequality separately, starting with the …rst phenomenon. We then review the possible implications for the incomes of the households in the bottom 99% of the income distribution.
Labor share of income
The stability of the labor share has been a fundamental feature of macroeconomic models since Kaldor (1957) . In a recent work, however, Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014) document that the labor share has decreased signi…cantly in the great majority of countries and industries since the early 1980s, with a decline in the order of 5 percentage points for the cross-country average (the labor share of the four largest countries is reported in …g. 8; more details for the U.S. are in Elsby et al., 2013). In particular, of the 59 countries with at least 15 years of data between 1975 and 2012, 42 exhibited downward trends in their labor shares and, of these, 39 have trend estimates that are statistically signi…cant. In addition, sectoral data show that most of the global decline in the labor share is attributable to within-industry changes and not to changes in the industrial composition of production.
The widespread nature of this decline, which involves not only capital-abundant advanced countries but also labor-abundant economies such as China, India and Mexico, calls for explanations that are common across countries. At the same time, global factors with e¤ects that are di¤erentiated across countries (such as increased trade openness and outsourcing) or country-speci…c shocks (such as changes in domestic institutions) should be less important.
A natural candidate explanation for the behavior of the labor share is the sharp decline in the price of capital goods relative to consumption goods that has occurred since the 1970s (Gordon, 1990) , which, in turn, is associated with the rapid di¤usion of ICT in the workplace. This phenomenon, in fact, was widespread across many countries and took place at broadly the same time as the decline of the labor share. Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014) build a growth model with a CES production function in which, unlike the Cobb-Douglas function used in equation (3), the elasticity of substitution between labor and physical capital can be potentially di¤erent from 1. Their estimates show that such elasticity is indeed larger than 1, equal to 1:25. Using this estimate, they show that the decline in the relative price of capital goods (equal to 25% between 1975 and 2012) explains about half of the reduction of the labor sharea result that turns out to be robust to several modi…cations of their benchmark model.
Wage inequality
The increasing availability of large-scale micro data in recent years has favored an explosion of studies on the distribution of wages across workers. These studies show that in many OECD countries the wage structure has changed considerably over the last decades.
In general, wage di¤erentials across workers have several dimensions: they depend on the level of education of workers, their gender, their experience, the type of job, and the industry and sector where they are employed. With the exception of the di¤erence between genders, which has diminished since the mid-1970s, all the other wage di¤erentials have tended to increase since at least the late 1970s, including the residual, unexplained wage dispersion (Katz and Autor, 1999) . In this section, we focus on the wage di¤erential between "skilled" workers, identi…ed as those with at least a college degree, and "unskilled" workers, those with lower educational attainments; this is the standard form of skill premium, which is closely related to technical change.
After narrowing substantially in all countries in the post-World War II period until the 1970s, the educational skill premium followed somewhat di¤erent patterns. In the U.S. and U.K., educational wage di¤erentials have increased greatly since the late 1970s. In most other OECD countries, instead, increases have been more modest (see Katz and Autor, 1999 , and, for the U.S., Heathcote et al., 2010). 28 Explaining the rise in the skill premium over the last three decades is complicated by the fact that, as we have discussed in the previous sections, the supply of skilled labor has increased substantially since 1900 and this trend continued after the 1970s (for the U.S. see …g 9, panel a). Two main explanations have emerged in the literature: one focuses on changes in technology that raise the demand for skilled workers, the other on the role of international trade.
The former explanation was put forward, in particular, in a very in ‡uential paper by Krusell et al. (2000) . These authors developed a model in which production occurs using capital equipment and two types of labor, skilled and unskilled. 29 In the model, they allow for di¤erent elasticities of substitution between unskilled labor and capital equipment ( uk ) and between skilled labor and capital equipment ( sk ). Their calibrations con…rm the pioneering …nding of Griliches (1969) about the existence of a capital-skill complementarity: the elasticity of substitution between skilled labor and capital equipment turns out to be smaller than 1, while the elasticity of substitution between unskilled labor and capital equipment is found to be larger than 1 (i.e.: sk < 1 < uk ). 30 In this context, the decline in the relative price of capital goods becomes a form of skill-biased technological progress: it favors the substitution of unskilled labor with capital and, at the same time, it requires more skilled workers to complement the rise in the capital stock. Krusell et al. (2000) show that the capital-skill complementarity, coupled with the decline in the relative price of capital goods, is able to explain almost the entire dynamic of the skill premium observed in the U.S. between 1963 and 1991 (see …g. 9, panel b). In a counterfactual simulation, these authors also assume sk = uk > 1, shutting o¤ the capital skill complementarity, to show that, due to the large increase in the relative size of skilled labor over the sample period, without the capital-skill complementarity the skill premium would have declined by 40% instead of rising by 20%.
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The di¤erent dynamics of the skill premium across di¤erent countries, however, open the way to other complementary explanations. Burstein and Vogel (2012) focus on the e¤ects of international trade. They consider a standard Heckscher-Ohlin model, in which countries di¤er in the endowment of skilled and unskilled labor and sectoral production di¤ers by the intensity of the use of the two factors, and modify two main aspects of it. First, they consider …rms that, in each sector, have heterogeneous productivity, to account for the fact that trade is mostly within sectors and that exporting …rms are generally larger and more productive. Second, within each sector, …rms differ not only in productivity but also in the intensity of the use of skilled workers, to account for the fact that, within each sector, exporters tend to be more skill intensive than non-exporters. In this setting, reductions in trade costs have two main e¤ects. On the one hand, the reallocation of demand across sectors follows the law of comparative advantage; then, lower trade costs increase the skill premium in skill-abundant countries and decrease it in skill-scarce countries. On the other hand, enhanced competition from foreign countries tends to raise demand for more productive exporters within each sector: because all these …rms have skill-intensive production, the skill premium tends to increase in all countries. By quantifying the model for a sample of 64 advanced and developing countries, Burstein and Vogel (2012) show that lowering trade costs from autarky to those observed in 2005-2007 has the following e¤ects: (i) real wages for both skilled and unskilled workers increase in all countries; (ii) the rise in real wages for skilled workers, however, is more than twice as large as that for unskilled workers (in the median country); (iii) the skill premium rises everywhere, but varies widely across countries. In particular, for small open economies like Costa Rica and Malaysia the skill premium increases by as much as 20%, but for large and relatively closed countries like the U.S. and Brazil, it increases by just 2%.
Outlook
Predicting the evolution of income inequality requires not only a forecast about TFP growth but also, as discussed above, a forecast about whether TFP gains are concentrated on capital goods, rather than consumption goods. By contrast, given that the U.S. is almost a closed economy (because trade occurs mostly within the country, despite very low tari¤ and non-tari¤ barriers), the evolution of globalization is much less important.
As explained in Section 3, Gordon (2012 and 2014) makes his main prediction about TFP growth simply by projecting into the future the rise in TFP observed since 1972. By the same token, he projects that inequality will evolve in the same way as it has done since the early 1970s. In particular, GDP per tax-unit for the households in the bottom 99% of the income distribution has grown at an annual rate that is 0:5 percentage points lower than the rate recorded for the entire U.S. population.
In light of the results discussed above, this assessment appears to be a compromise between two opposite tendencies. On the one hand, to the extent that current research is focused mainly on the development of consumption devices, as Gordon asserts, this prediction might be pessimistic: productivity growth in the consumption-goods sector should attenuate both the decline in the labor share and the skill premium, reducing inequality growth. On the other hand, lower human capital accumulation, i.e. lower growth in the number of college-graduate workers, should push up their wages, amplifying the skill premium and income inequality.
Insights from economic history
The analysis developed in the previous sections has shown that the most important factors that one should consider in order to predict long-term economic growth are TFP, population (which, in turn, contributes to TFP), human capital and, to the extent that the policy-maker is interested in more than mere GDP growth for the average individual, income inequality. In this section, we examine these factors from a broader historical perspective.
The debate on secular stagnation is, in fact, a cyclical question: it has been raised following almost any deep and prolonged recession. It may be useful, then, to brie ‡y review the data and arguments that were analyzed in the past, in order to understand, with the bene…t of hindsight, the reasons why pessimistic predictions turned out to be wrong. As exempli…ed by the work of Alvin Hansen during the 1930s, 32 the debate has often revolved around the issues of technical change and population growth. 33 Therefore, after revisiting these "older concerns", we turn to the two features that have been incorporated in neoclassical models of economic growth only more recently, human capital and income inequality, and examine them through the lenses of a longerrun perspective.
Older concerns: TFP and population
Economic historians remind us that the question of secular stagnation has been raised several times over the last century, and especially after strong recessions, such as in the aftermath of the Long Depression of 1873-1879 and the Great Depression of 1929-1933, towards the end of World War II, during the stagnation of the 1970s, and again in the late 1980s. 34 Interestingly, many alarming signs identi…ed today are quite similar to those considered by Alvin Hansen in 1938, during the recovery that followed the Great Depression. As in much of the earlier and subsequent literature, Hansen was especially worried about the development of two key factors: technical change and population.
As regards technical change, Hansen acknowledged that inventions were the main determinants of economic growth and related their development to capital deepening. 35 His worries stemmed from the fact that, in his view, the period 1934-1937 had been a "consumption recovery", with insu¢ cient investment. His analysis was also grounded 32 Alvin Hansen (1887 Hansen ( -1975 , often referred to as "the American Keynes" (Nasar, 2012), was a professor of economics at Harvard and an in ‡uential advisor to the government, who helped create the Council of Economic Advisors and the Social Security System. He introduced Keynesian economics in the United States, clarifying its implications (Hansen, 1936) . He was the mentor of Paul Samuelson, who credited him for inspiring the formalization of the multiplier-accelerator model (Samuelson, 1939) . 33 Other factors that have often been identi…ed as posing signi…cant threats to economic growth are a possible depletion of natural resources and pollution (see, for example, the famous study by Meadows et al., 1972) . 34 For a sample of the arguments raised in the historical periods mentioned above, see, in particular, Wells (1891), Hansen (1938 and , Harris (1943) , Nordhaus (1972) , Baily and Gordon (1988) , and Krugman (1990). in the apparent prospects of U.S. industries. In particular, he claimed that the main engines that fuelled growth in the XIX century -steel, textiles and railroads -had been exhausted; on the other hand, the newest drivers of innovation -automobiles and the radio -had already become mature. 36 Population was considered as a key determinant of inventions, not only indirectly, because it stimulated capital deepening, but also directly, because it "facilitated mass production methods and accelerated the progress of technique". This view, in the tradition of Adam Smith, is very similar to the modern view of Kremer (1993) and Jones (2002) , and contrary to the Malthusian theory. Hansen (1939) observed that the population growth rate had halved and estimated that, in the second half of the XIX century, population growth had contributed to about 60% of the increase in the capital stock. 37 Therefore, he deemed that "a rapid cessation of population growth" could have a strong negative impact on capital formation and TFP. Moreover, in the tradition of the emerging Keynesian economics, Hansen was convinced that the combined e¤ect of the decline in population growth and the lack of innovations of signi…cant magnitude were the premises not only of a prolonged stagnation, but also explained the failure of the recovery to reach full employment. 38 The stagnation, as we know, did not materialize. It may prove useful, then, to review the reasons why Hansen's predictions failed, in spite of their reliance on sound evidence and arguments, as data did support the slowdown of TFP and population, while lower population growth had been correctly identi…ed as a factor that could have weakened the incentives to innovate. First, concerning technology, the contribution of electricity to TFP had been surprisingly neglected. Yet, the "electri…cation of America" was one of the main developments of the early XX century (Nye, 1990 ). For example, in 1899 electric lighting was used in a mere 3% of all U.S. residences; in the following two decades, electri…cation had already reached 50% of all residences and establishments; after 1917, when its cost declined substantially, the di¤usion of electricity rapidly became almost universal (David, 1990) . With the wide coverage achieved by electricity, inventors turned to the development of consumer goods: by the 1930s, the commercialization of many home appliances had already started, although the boom did not occur after World War II. Second, the assessment of the maturity of the automobile industry turned out to be incorrect. The production of automobiles increased further after the 1930s and spread to other countries. This phenomenon continued to 36 Merton (1935) , for example, showed that the number of patents issued for inventions related to the automobile and the radio industry had started to decline in the early 1920s; in the aeroplane industry, the decline had started even earlier, in 1918. 37 Following similar remarks by Keynes (1937) , Hansen (1939) noted that U.S. residents had increased by 16 millions during the 1920s (17 millions according to the most recently revised data), while in the 1930s the rise was estimated to be in the order of 8 million (9 million using modern data). 38 Fifty years later, Samuelson formalized this argument in the Keynes-Hansen-Samuelson multiplieraccelerator model of secular stagnation (Samuelson, 1988 ).
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fuel the growth of inventions to our days: in 2012 the automobile industry was still the third highest-ranking industry for patent generation (preceded only by "telecommunications" and "computers and peripherals"). Third, it is also surprising that the possibility that television would replace the radio was altogether ignored. Although television was popularized only at the New York World Fair in 1939, in the late 1920s its commercialization had already begun (although in limited amounts); the ancestors of CBS and NBC (WRGB and W2XBS, respectively) started broadcasting in 1928; in 1932 Telefunken sold the …rst televisions with cathode-ray tubes in Germany, soon followed by other manufacturers in France and the U.K.; the BBC began broadcasting in 1936. Fourth, turning to population, the annual rate of growth of U.S. residents turned out to be less predictable than what was previously thought: after averaging only 0.6% during the entire recovery of 1934-1937, in 1941 it was already above 1.0% and then, in 1947, the baby boom started, lasting about 20 years, with growth rates of almost 2.0%.
In retrospect, this experience shows how easy it is to underestimate the potential of technologies that already exist, rather than the di¢ culty of predicting new technologies, and suggests that the pessimism about ICT may be unwarranted. The spread of computers among U.S. households and businesses has matched that of electricity quite closely: in less than four decades since the early 1970s, computers have entered almost all U.S. houses and workplaces, just like electricity did at the start of the XX century. Moreover, research in the ICT sector is currently turning to the development of consumption devices, resembling the shift towards home appliances that occurred in the 1920s and 1930s and that anticipated the economic boom observed after World War II. 39 The skepticism about the contribution of ICT to TFP growth and its possible maturity also seems unjusti…ed. As shown by Crafts (2002) , the contribution of ICT to capital deepening and TFP growth in the U.S. in 1974-2000 was greater than the early contributions of the two other main general-purpose technologies developed during the Industrial Revolution, i.e. electricity (for the U.S. in 1899-1929) and steam (for the U.K. in 1780-1860). 40 Moreover, in the past, long periods of productivity slowdown occurred frequently during expansionary phases, such as in 1890-1913, after the Great Depression, and between the mid-1970s and mid-1990s. Following phases of lower growth, the U.S. economy has always entered periods of sharp upturn in productivity, leading to the long-run stability of GDP growth per capita. While one cannot take it for granted that such an acceleration will happen again, the current weakness of TFP growth is likely to be due to a process of resource reallocation across sectors induced by the Great Recession that is still incomplete and that may turn out to be only temporary. Finally, we should not forget that general-purpose technologies always took many decades to exert their full e¤ects on the economy. 41 The technologies, tools and resources with the highest economic impact may have already been invented, but it may take time before they change our lives. 42 More in general, the key question concerning TFP is whether there are diminishing returns on research activity; that is, whether making progress becomes increasingly dif…cult as technology advances. The fact that, historically, the number of patents granted could scarcely keep pace with the growth of population or with R&D expenditure has often been interpreted as evidence of diminishing returns (see, for example, Merton, 1935 , or Griliches, 1990 ). This is, however, still a very open issue. The stability of the growth rate of GDP per capita in the long run does not allow us to rule out that technological progress has instead a "fractal quality". In other words, it may well be that the probability that TFP increases does not depend on the level of TFP. Incidentally, it is worth noting that the Pareto distribution, which is often used to describe productivities in the cross-section of …rms, has exactly this fractal property. 43 The alternative paths of TFP represented in Figure 10 seem to be all equally plausible, and more research is needed to explore the properties of both the evolution of aggregate TFP over time as well as those of TFP in the cross-section of individual …rms. 44 Regarding population, the experience of the XX century suggests that, in the medium-long term, its growth rates may ‡uctuate in a rather unpredictable way. More 41 As Joel Mokyr (2013) put it, 50 years after its invention, the steam engine was probably viewed has a machine that "made a lot of noise, emitted a lot of smoke and stench, and pumped some water out of few coal mines". Similarly, as remarked by Paul David in 1990 (rephrasing Robert Solow's famous quip), many observers living in 1900 might have asserted that electric dynamos were "everywhere but in the productivity statistics". 42 Brynjolfsson and McAfee (2014) discuss several promising innovations, including recent developments in robotics, 3D-printers, self-driving cars, computer-aided diagnosis in medicine, possible o¤springs from genome sequencing, etc.. Gordon (2014) and Vijg (2011) question the economic impact of most of them. Promising discoveries, however, seem to be made every day. Only recently a team of researchers claims to have, for the …rst time, extracted more energy from controlled nuclear fusion than was absorbed by the fuel to trigger it (Ball, 2014) . If con…rmed, this result would cross an important symbolic threshold on the path to exploiting this virtually unlimited source of energy. 43 A truncated Pareto distribution, in fact, is still a Pareto distribution. To understand why this matters, assume, for example, that the TFP evolves stochastically, following a Pareto distribution; namely, A t P areto(1; ), where t is time (with A t i.i.d.). Suppose, also, that technological progress is an increase in the level of TFP from a value of at least a 0 to a value of at least a 00 > a 0 . Then, the probability that technological progress occurs is Pr (A t+1 > a 00 jA t > a 0 ) = (a 0 =a 00 ) . As a consequence, raising a 0 and a 00 proportionally does not change the probability that technological progress occurs. 44 Finicelli et al. (2014) show, for both closed and open economies, that aggregate TFP is a speci…c moment (whose order depends on consumer preferences) of the distribution of TFP across …rms. importantly, the theory presented in Section 4 implies that the relevant population for TFP growth is given by the people that can actually help push the technology frontier outward. Many indicators, such as the increase in the share of U.S. patents granted to foreign residents, signal that this population no longer coincides with the U.S. labor force. The magnitude of the size e¤ect for future TFP growth, then, is likely to bene…t greatly from the integration of emerging countries into the global economy and their future contributions to the technology frontier.
6.2 Newer concerns:
Although the improvement of workers'skills as a source of economic progress goes back at least to Adam Smith, it was not until after World War II that human capital has been incorporated in neoclassical models of growth. From this perspective, the cornerstone in the quanti…cation of human capital is the theoretical and empirical model of wages of Jacob Mincer (1958 and 1974) . As a result of his work, human capital is still measured using data on schooling and workers'experience, as in equation (4).
To the extent that schooling and experience are the most relevant factors for workers'skills, however, two main problems emerge (see also Section 3). In the short run, the increasing relative costs of higher education are making it less a¤ordable, thereby hampering human capital. In the longer run, human capital accumulation is bounded from above: work experience is limited by the retirement age, years of schooling by the fact that, well before the retirement age, students must exit school to repay education costs.
The problem of rising education costs could be e¤ectively addressed by a varieties of policies and, then, projections for human capital growth could turn out to be pessimistic if they do not take this fact into account. For example, the "higher education initiative" of the U.S. government aims to keep costs down and make college education a¤ordable. 45 But private initiatives are also helping to address the problem. One important phenomenon that is currently emerging is the rapid proliferation of Internet-based educational resources. In particular, lecture videos and other online teaching tools are making education almost "non-rivalrous". Acemoglu et al. (2014) have recently build a theoretical model to understand the possible consequences of this phenomenon. Their model predicts that, in the future, lectures could be provided by a handful of "superstar global teachers", while local teachers, freed from lecturing, would be allocated to other complementary activities. An important result of this model is a process of "democratization of education", in which high-quality educational resources will be more equally distributed.
Turning to the second problem, the main question that arises is whether measuring human capital by using the average number of years of schooling and work experience is still appropriate. One issue that also a¤ects the measurement of physical capital concerns the quanti…cation of the quality of capital (i.e. its intensive margin). Attempts to exploit data on school resources and test scores as proxies for the quality of education in order to augment the quantity-based measure of human capital, however, lead to trivially small di¤erences (for example, they are not helpful in explaining cross-country income di¤erences; see Caselli, 2005 ).
An issue that has been neglected in the economic literature is the explosion of specializations in all …elds of knowledge. A question that would be worth examining, then, is whether human capital can grow by extending the varieties of knowledge (extensive margin), even if the average years of schooling remain constant. In fact, it is possible that the competencies of college graduates 60 years ago were more similar to each other than what they are today, given the much higher number of faculties, types of college degree and university courses that are currently o¤ered. Thus, even though the average years of schooling for college graduates were the same as 60 years ago, the fact that, together, new college graduates embed a larger variety of competencies may provide an additional boost to economic growth. If this were true, human cap-ital could keep contributing to economic growth over and above the mere number of years of schooling. More in general, one could question the view that human capital is embodied only in each single individual and the related practice of measuring the aggregate stock of human capital simply as the sum of these individual stocks. Further research is needed to understand whether the aggregate stock of human capital is more than just the sum of the stocks of the single individuals and whether it also depends on the varieties of knowledge, the way individuals interact with each other, etc.. 46 
... and inequality
Even though income inequality has been one of the key issues since the very birth of classical political economy in the XVIII century, for a long time studies on the income distribution were based only on very few facts and were instead built on a wide variety of purely theoretical speculations (Piketty, 2014) . For example, the theory put forth by Kuznets (1953 and 1955) , who conjectured that income inequality increases in the early stages of economic development and then decreases after a certain average income is attained, was based on very precise data only for the period 1913-1948, in which inequality declined constantly, and scant evidence, at best, for the late XIX century. 47 This is because the main data source for studies on income inequality are tax records and, although taxes were systematically collected even in antiquity, the introduction of income taxes is been relatively recent. In the U.S., in particular, personal income tax was temporarily introduced, for the …rst time, during the Civil War (in 1861, only to be repealed the following year) and did not became a permanent component of the U.S. tax system until 1913.
Data on income inequality, as summarized by the share of total income earned by the households in the top percentile of the income distribution, show that inequality decreased between 1913 and the early 1950s, remained stable until the late 1970s, and has then started to increase (…g. 11). Based on this data, inequality would seem a relatively recent phenomenon. Extending the analysis to before 1913 using data on wages, however, shows that inequality also rose during the XIX century. According to Piketty (2014) , the picture that emerges is more one of a steady rise of income inequality since the Industrial Revolution, with few periods of stable inequality (in 1870-1913 and 1950-1980) , and only one period of decline (in 1914-1949) . Thus, it would appear that the only forces that have been able to reduce income inequality have been the shocks that occurred with the two World Wars.
As discussed in Section 5, income inequality is closely related to the skill premium. 46 Studies focusing on the importance of social capital -de…ned as the expected collective bene…t derived from the way in which individuals interact, cooperate, and trust one another -express a similar view. By considering di¤erent types of workers and sectors, the interpretation of the evolution of inequality that emerges seems to be more complex . First, in the XIX century technical change in the manufacturing sector was predominantly "de-skilling": the demand for unskilled workers increased substantially, as the adoption of the steam engine and the factory system favored the substitution of relatively skilled artisans with unskilled operatives. De-skilling, however, did not happen in the rest of the economy, where skill upgrading occurred continuously from 1850 to the 1980s: demand for low-skill workers tended to decline, for middle-skill workers it remained constant, and for high-skill workers it increased (Katz and Margo, 2013) . Finally, the last three decades show a pattern of increased polarization, in which demand for middle-skill jobs is declining, while that for low-skill and high-skill workers is growing. Overall, it appears that wage gaps between di¤erent types of workers and di¤erent sectors have increased or decreased as technology has evolved, depending on the features of technical change. 48 Can we reconcile these dynamics with economic theory? In principle, the price mechanism could be a potentially important "re-equilibrating force". As the demand for some inputs -types of workers, natural resources or goods -grows, their price 48 For example, the pro…les of the households in the high and low percentiles of the income distribution have changed substantially over time: the highest-income households were land-owners in the early XIX century, industrial capitalists until the 1980s, and, more recently, they appear to be more evenly distributed across sectors. As Piketty and Saez (2003) put it, "the working rich have now replaced the coupon-clipping rentiers". On the other hand, the lowest-income workers were found …rst in the agricultural sector and later became proletariats living in industrial cities. rises, weakening demand. In addition, technological research may concentrate on how to use alternative inputs that are more widely available replacing those that are scarce, or on how to augment the supply of scarce goods, reducing relative price di¤erences.
In a famous study, Rogo¤ et al. (2001) examined the relative prices of a number of basic goods over a 700-year period. 49 Their results show that product prices have a tendency to revert to a central mean over very long periods. Of course, workers are not commodities, but it may well be that as some workers become increasingly expensive relative to others, research may focus on …nding ways to substitute away from these high-cost inputs. In particular, the vast migration from rural areas and from Ireland to English cities during the late XVIII century may have favored the development of the factory system and the replacement of skilled artisans with unskilled workers; later, the expansion of educated labor over the post-war period made it pro…table to develop machines complementary to skilled workers (Acemoglu, 2002 , Violante, 2008 . Today, technological progress may focus on the development of tools and devices that enable education costs to be reduced, raising the supply of skilled workers. The proliferation of Internet-based educational resources, discussed above, is just one example. 50 Thus, the price mechanism can be a powerful force for promoting equality, but because the adjustment of demand and, especially, supply can take decades, relative wage di¤erentials can temporarily become very wide, fuelling large and persistent income inequalities. It may well be, then, that inequality follows long cycles. Public policies, such as progressive tax systems and the promotion of better and more affordable education and training for unskilled workers, may help attenuate these cycles. Because both market forces and public policies can be quite e¤ective in reducing wage di¤erentials, predictions of income inequality over the next few decades by simple extrapolation from recent trends may turn out to be severely misleading.
Conclusion
Recent studies have conjectured that the U.S. economy may soon return to a phase of secular stagnation. There is some consensus on the fact that, in the next 20 to 50 years, the growth of U.S. GDP per capita -equal to an average annual rate of 2:2% 49 Their study considers barley, butter, cheese, oats, peas, silver, and wheat, covering not only the dynamics of the di¤erences between the prices of the same good in two di¤erent countries (the U.K. and the Netherlands) -which is the main focus of the study -but also the dynamics of the di¤erences between the prices of two di¤erent goods in the same country. 50 The use of ICT is now pervasive in the U.S. education system, from students enrollment, to the assignment and submission of homeworks, to the grading and publishing of test results. Computerassisted scoring, for example, has been used for many years for most large-scale assessment programs, such as the Graduate Management Aptitude Test (GMAT) and the Graduate Record Examination (GRE). More recently, attention is turning to softwares that can scan essays for plagiarism as well as grade them.
-will decrease due to "transitory factors" (mainly hours worked and education). The contribution of these factors, equal to 0:5 percentage points in the post-war period, could become nil in the years ahead, up until 2060, as a result of the retirement of baby boomers, the approaching of a plateau in the years of schooling, and rising relative costs of higher education. But some studies also add that TFP could sharply decelerate, as the e¤ects of ICT seem to have already peaked, TFP has already started to slow down, and no other major breakthrough is in sight. Its contribution to GDP per capita could decline from 1:6 percentage points in 1950-2007 to just 1:0 points over the next few decades. Thus, the lower contributions of TFP and transitory factors imply that the growth of GDP per capita will halve, increasing at a rate of just 1:1%.
The analysis of GDP per capita focuses on the average household, neglecting the fact that, in the last 30 years, income has already been stagnating for the households in the bottom 99% of the income distribution. If inequality keeps growing at the same speed as it has in the last three decades, the incomes of the households in the bottom 99% of the distribution will grow at an annual rate that is 0:5 percentage points lower than the rate recorded for the entire U.S. population. Therefore, if the projections of a 1:1% GDP per capita growth are con…rmed, these households'income will increase at a rate of just 0:6%.
The debate on secular stagnation, however, seems to be a cyclical question, which has been raised after all deep and prolonged recessions. Revisiting the arguments made in the past suggests that pessimistic predictions turned out to be wrong neither because they built on erroneous theories or data, nor because they failed in predicting new technologies, but because they underestimated the potential of technologies that already existed. This suggests that we should not make the same mistake today and undervalue the potential e¤ects of the information technology.
Historical experience also suggests a number of issues that should be tackled by future research, including: (i) the properties of TFP in the time series and the crosssection of …rms, to examine whether there are diminishing returns on the research activity or whether technological progress has instead a "fractal quality", so that the probability that TFP increases does not depend on its level; (ii) the extent to which the integration of emerging countries into the global economy can contribute to the growth of the world technology frontier; (iii) whether human capital can grow even if the years of schooling and work experience remain constant, by extending the intensive and extensive margins of knowledge; (iv) the possible endogeneity of the direction of technical change and the analysis inequality cycles. Second, the assumption of declining productivity throughout lifetimes a¤ects consumption growth in two di¤erent ways. A higher rate of productivity decline (i.e. a larger !) raises consumption as the new generations enter with higher-than-the-average wages. For larger !, however, the generation replacement e¤ect (which lowers consumption) is also larger. Assume also that the rate of technological progress, x, declines from 2% to 0. Figure  12) shows that the implied interest rate at the initial steady state (the intersection of the two solid black lines) is r = 1%; after the decline in x, the interest rate in the new steady state (the intersection of the two dashed red lines) becomes r = 0:6%.
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Given the above parameters, how large should ! be in order to obtain an equilibrium interest rate equal to 2%? Simple algebra shows that, even if the rate of technological progress is zero, the rate of wage decline should be very large, in the order of 20% per year.
Thus, the fact that people retire and labor income declines may lead to ine¢ cient capital accumulation, as the equilibrium interest rate is lower than the sum of the exogenous rates of TFP and population growth. A negative NRIR, however, obtains only under implausibly steep declines of wages through the lifetime. 54 53 A decrease in x shifts the (k 0 =0)-curve upward and the (c 0 =0)-curve rightward, raising the steadystate capital stock and reducing the equilibrium interest rate. The e¤ect on aggregate consumption is, instead, ambiguous. 54 In the case of ine¢ cient overaccumulation of capital, an important policy implication regards the e¤ect of …scal policy. With …nite lifetimes (and without altruism) taxes introduced at di¤erent times are levied on di¤erent sets of people and, therefore, government …nancing a¤ects consumption choices. Examples can be built, in particular, in which an increase in public spending and an o¤setting increase in taxes reduce the steady-state capital stock and raise the natural real interest rate.
